Self-Disclosure, Separation, and Students: Intimacy in the Clinical Relationship by Sullivan, Kathleen A.




I met most of my clinic students for the first time at an informal
coffee hour my colleague and I arranged at the beginning of the new
semester, before the first clinic class. Although the event was designed
to allow the students to meet each other, it seemed a little awkward
because I was trying to meet the students for the first time also, and
this was an unfamiliar role for me. I usually came to a new school
year having at least met all of my clinic students, because I have been
involved in selecting them to participate in the clinic, and the clinic's
selection process includes a personal interview. I had not met most of
these students, however, because I had been on maternity leave when
they had been selected.
At the coffee hour one of the students asked about my baby, and
I brought out my baby pictures. It seemed like a good icebreaker, and
innocent enough. However, as each new student approached me, looked
at the pictures of my daughter, and asked questions about her and my
maternity leave, I felt increasingly awkward and exposed. I felt the
students had come to me to learn how to be lawyers and here I was,
relating to them as a mother. I felt I had been unprofessional.
My reaction was purely intuitive, but there is psychological literature
which supports my feeling that I had compromised my image as a
competent professional by this self-disclosure. Studies of therapeutic
relationships, for example, reveal that while patients generally react
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positively to self-disclosure by their counselor, patients react disapprov-
ingly to counselors who reveal too much, particularly in the initial
counseling interview.
My discomfort also related to my perception that by revealing myself
to my students as I was meeting them I may have been giving up some
of the status which, because of my position as a law faculty member,
I might otherwise have been accorded. Again, my intuitive recognition
is supported in the psychological literature.'
Status is characterized by asymmetry in terms of address and asym-
metry of patterns of self-disclosure. 2 Personal information generally flows
in the opposite direction from the flow of authority, so that one generally
reveals more to one's immediate superior than to one's immediate sub-
ordinate.' My early self-disclosure to the students reversed this pattern,
and I feared I projected less authority as a result.4
Furthermore, when there is a clear difference in status between two
persons, the right to initiate change to a more intimate form of rela-
tionship lies with the superior.5 My discomfort was heightened by the
sense that by my self-disclosure I had invited my students to engage in
a more intimate relationship with me. In this respect, I am reminded
of the value feminists place on women's connectedness while simulta-
neously fearing its invasive potential. 6
Yet there is some sense in which clinical student-teacher relationships
are, or at least may become, more intimate than those of traditional
law school professors and students; my self-disclosure on meeting my
clinic students was certainly less inappropriate than it might have been
had I passed around pictures of my baby in a large lecture class.
This article represents an attempt to understand the extent to which
my relationships with my clinical students can fairly be characterized as
1. See, e.g., Randi L. Carter & Robert W. Motta, Effects of Intimacy of Therapist's
Self-Disclosure and Formality on Perceptions of Credibility in an Initial Interview, 66
PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKrILs 167, 172 (1988); Norman R. Simonson, The Impact of
Therapist Disclosure on Patient Disclosure, 23 J. oF ComsmMNO PsYcHOL. 3, 3-6 (1976);
Mark J. Miller, Beyond "Mm-Hm": The Importance of Counselor Disclosure, 27 CouN-
sELiNG AND VALUES 90, 94 (1983).
2. Nancy M. Henley, Power, Sex and Nonverbal Communication, BERKELEY J.
Soc. 1, 8 (1973).
3. Id.
4. My concern about projecting less authority may also have been related to the
fact that I revealed myself in a less powerful role, i.e., that of a mother. (Mothers are
generally perceived as less powerful than law professors.).
5. Henley, supra note 2, at 9.
6. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. C. L. Rnv. 1, 4-
42 (1988).
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intimate, and the extent to which intimacy is a feature of clinical teaching
relationships generally. I approach this task with a fair degree of trep-
idation, in part because I fear that my attempt to generalize about
clinicians' relationships with students is bound to reflect, and therefore
be limited by, my own experiences. I also fear that the more self-
conscious we are about our interactions with students the more potential
we have to manipulate those interactions. As clinicians, we may do too
much of that already.
I am convinced, however, as I continue to talk with clinical teachers,
that our relationships with our students present the greatest challenge
in our work. I am also convinced that attempts to be more self-conscious
about our relationships with students, like our efforts to .theorize about
lawyering skills, are valuable. This may be so particularly because re-
lationships consume much of clinical teachers' energy. I try, for example,
to help students negotiate the boundaries of their relationships with
clients, adversaries and each other as I simultaneously, and very visibly,
balance my own relationships with clients, adversaries, students and
colleagues.
Moreover, as clinicians mature, it may be useful to remind ourselves
what it is about our relationships with students that enhances our ef-
fectiveness as teachers. In this regard, as a young clinical teacher, I
think I was often guilty of overidentification with my students (i.e., too
much intimacy). The challenge for the future, as age and other factors
make me less like many of my students, is to be able maintain a
sufficient degree of connection with them to be effective.7
In this Article, I will assert three theses about intimacy between
clinical teachers and students. First, clinical teaching is, potentially at
least, a more intimate form of teaching than traditional teaching, and
disclosure plays an important role in making the clinical relationship
more intimate. Second, though often problematic and complicated, clin-
ical teaching's greater potential for intimacy is a positive thing. Intimacy
creates dilemmas for clinical teachers and students, most of which center
around issues of power and control. Third, there are analogies between
the issues of intimacy and distance in the clinical relationship and the
themes of connection and separation which recur in feminist scholarship.
The feminist search for the proper accommodation of connection and
7. See Carol D. Ryff & Susan Migdal, Intimacy and Generativity: Self-Perceived
Transitions, SIGNS 470, 477-78 (Spring 1984). The psychologist Erik Erikson theorized that
intimacy is more important in young adulthood, and generativity becomes more important
as one ages. Erik Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, I PSYCHOL. IssuEs 120 (1959).
Ryff and Migdal tested Erikson's thesis on a sample of young and middle aged women,
and largely replicated Erikson's findings.
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separation is helpful to a clinical teacher in negotiating the boundaries
of her relationships with her students.
In Part I of this Article, I will explore the concept of intimacy in
clinical law teaching, its value and the dilemmas it poses. Part II will
explore the literature on clinical supervision with reference to the range
of choices clinicians make about disclosure in their supervision and the
issues this poses. Part III will discuss the themes of connection and
separation in feminist scholarship and suggest ways in which these themes
may illuminate the problems of distance and intimacy in the clinical
relationship.
I. INTIMACY, LAW SCHOOL METHODOLOGY, AND THE DILEMMAS FOR
RELATIONSHIPS
A. Defining Intimacy and its Limits in Clinical Teaching
Defining the intimacy of which I speak is a delicate task. As I have
discussed this project with other clinical teachers, a number have suggested
that, although relationships between clinical students and teachers are
different and perhaps closer than those between most traditional law
teachers and students, there is nothing particularly intimate about these
relationships. Some have suggested, for example, that because the term
intimacy often includes a sexual component, it is not an appropriate
term to describe the relationship between law teachers and law students.8
This is not, however, the sense of intimacy I mean to convey. 9
8. Martha Fineman, Intimacy Outside of the Natural Family: The Limits of
Privacy, 23 CoN. L. REv. 955, 970 (1991) (criticizing the traditional view of intimacy
between men and women for its emphasis on sexual affiliation); see Stephen Thayer, Close
Encounters: Silent But Powerful, A Touch Can Comfort, Greet, Persuade, Inflame,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar. 1988, at 30.
9. My definition of intimacy is somewhat more expansive than that provided in
the legal literature on privacy. Julie Inness, for example, identifies two ways in which
intimacy may be defined. JULIE C. INzEss, PRIVACY, INT1MACY, AND ISOLATION 74-94
(1992). The first is from a "behaviourist" direction, by finding the characteristics of the
behavior constituting intimate acts and activities. The second is in "motivational" terms,
i.e. by finding some aspect of the motivations demanded by certain acts and activities
that could identify them as intimate. Inness rejects the behaviourist definition, arguing
that behaviors depend for their meaning on the motivations attached to them, which may
vary depending on the culture. Thus, a kiss, or a tap on the shoulder may or may not
be an expression of intimacy, depending on the motivations of actors, and the cultural
meanings attached to these behaviors. Inness adopts a motivational definition of intimacy
as that deriving its meaning and value from the agent's love, liking or care. See also
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 484 (1968) ("[I]ntimacy is the sharing of
information about one's actions, beliefs, or emotions which one does not share with all,
[Vol. 27:115
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There are other qualities normally associated with the term intimacy
that don't translate comfortably into the relationship between clinical
teachers and students. For example, the common notion of intimacy
conveys a sense of exclusivity.'0 My most intimate relationships are with
individuals who, like my spouse and my child, have the potential to
make claims on my time and myself exclusive of all other claims. I
certainly cannot describe a similar relationship with my students. Yet I
strive with each of my students to know them personally and closely
while not letting my relationships with any of them exclude any other
of my students.
Despite the term's imperfection, I remain convinced that intimacy
is the right word, and that relationships between clinical students and
teachers are at least somewhat more intimate than those between tra-
ditional teachers and students. Thus, the clinical relationship is char-
acterized by a potential for intimacy. I recognize, however, that intimacy
is a loaded term and requires some effort at definition.
My concept of intimacy is characterized by four features: proximity,
mutuality, trust and self-disclosure." Because the qualities are themselves
so interconnected, it is difficult to discuss separately how each of these
aspects of intimacy relate to clinical supervision. Nevertheless, I will
attempt to do so in what follows.
1. Proximity.-There are two senses in which a clinical teacher's
relationship with her students is characterized by proximity. The first
refers to physical closeness or nearness. Most clinical teachers interact
with their students more frequently, and work with them more closely
than traditional law teachers. My students, for example, spend roughly
twenty hours each week working just outside my office. I rely on this
proximity in supervising my students, in having them sufficiently near
to know how their casework is progressing, and to observe their inter-
and which one has the right not to share with anyone.").
In the discussion of intimacy which follows, I adopt a more behaviourist definition
and am content to do so. Because I argue not that clinical teaching is an inherently
intimate enterprise, only that it is more intimate than traditional law teaching, the be-
haviourist definition is less problematic for me than for Inness (who is trying to determine
the parameters of privacy to be accorded intimate actions.). Thus, as a kiss - regardless
of its cultural meaning, rzigardless of what motivates it - is a more intimate interaction
than passing another on the street, so clinical teaching (for the reasons which follow) is
a more intimate form of teaching than traditional law teaching, regardless of whether
clinical teaching is, in some absolute sense, an intimate act.
10. Fried, supra note 9.
11. Intimacy has also been described as "sharing, taking into confidence and
trusting." Marilyn P. Mindingall, Characteristics of Female Clients That Influence Pref-
erence for the Socially Intimate and Nonintimate Female Psychotherapists, 41 J. oF CIncAL
PSYCHOL. 188, 189 (1985).
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actions with partners, office staff, and clients. Similarly, my students
rely on the accessibility that my proximity allows. Their questions can
be answered when they need them answered, and they have a role model
whose behavior they can consider.
It is not only in the confines of the law office that clinical students
and teachers share close quarters. Clinical supervision forces students
and teacher into close, often intense interaction under stressful conditions.
Students and teachers, for example, appear together in court, and together
attend depositions, counsel clients and negotiate with adversaries. These
shared activities require students and teachers to plan and strategize
together, to often travel together, to wait together in courthouses for
cases to be called, and even to eat meals together.
The other sense of proximity is that a clinician's relationship with
her clinical students is generally closer and more familiar than a traditional
law teacher's relationship with most of her students. One reflection of
this closer relationship is the way clinical teachers and students address
one another. Unlike the formal modes of address that are often featured
in the traditional law school classroom, where the teacher addresses the
students by title (Mr. or Ms.) and last name, and the students address
the teacher similarly by title (Professor) and last name, patterns of
address in the clinic are generally much less formal. In the clinical
setting, students and teachers most often address each other by their
first names.
1 2
Although certainly some self-disclosure results from proximity, there
may also be an inverse relationship between proximity and self-disclosure.
For example, we sometimes reveal more about ourselves to telephone
acquaintances or to strangers than to our neighbors. Proximity has a
way of raising the stakes for making disclosure, knowing that one will
be interacting closely with the individual on a dally basis."
12. In my experience, even clinical teachers have more formal relationships with
their non-clinical students. For the past several years, I have taught a non-clinical course
in Law and Poverty. I have noticed how much less close my relationships with the Law
and Poverty students are than my relationships with my clinical students. They are less
proximate in both of my senses. I see them much less (two hours each week, versus
roughly twenty hours each week that I see my clinical students); most venture near my
office rarely, if ever, whereas the clinical students are in or near my office most every
day. Law and Poverty is also a larger class than the clinic that I teach (35 Law and
Poverty students versus 12 clinic students.) Thus, I know each student in my Law and
Poverty class less well, and we are much more formal with each other. Most of my Law
and Poverty students call me "Professor Sullivan;" few of my clinical students do.
13. The necessary connection between proximity and self disclosure is reflected in
a conversation I had with a non-clinical female colleague. She does not invite her students
to use her first name, preferring to be called "Professor." She believes this makes her
better able to be more open about her feelings in class.
[Vol. 27:115
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It may also be a reflection of, or a consequence of, proximity or
maybe just the quirkiness of my own experience that the door to a
clinician's office is often left unlocked when the clinician is not present.
I happen to reflect on this because I sometimes have an office in the
"traditional" faculty wing in addition to my clinic office and have
observed that many of my traditional colleagues keep their doors locked
when they are not around. It may be, as has been suggested to me,
that clinicians do not lock their doors because they have nothing worth
stealing. I suspect, however, that clinicians' unlocked doors also reflect
an acknowledgement that the clinic is a place of greater proximity and
lesser privacy than the traditional faculty wing.
Clinicians' proximity to their students is not always completely vol-
untary. There are times, for example, when I long for an opportunity
to retreat to the traditional faculty wing. There are times when I feel
like I am being followed too closely, even "hounded" by my students.
Proximity can be even less voluntary for students, because teachers
have the power to insist upon it. If my students are not spending
sufficient time in the office, I think something is amiss. It concerns me
when a student is not around even in the odd situation where the student
is not falling behind in her casework.' 4
Distance is the opposite of proximity. Perhaps because clinical legal
education is a methodology developed and implemented by law teachers
within institutions steeped in rules and hierarchy, and which value au-
tonomy, independence, written communication and abstract thought, the
relationship between clinical law students and teachers is also charac-
terized by distance.
I consider grading the ultimate distancing process for a clinical
teacher.' 5 In contrast to the face-to-face evaluation which most clinical
teachers also employ,' 6 the student is excluded from the grading process. '
7
14. This discussion of voluntariness is somewhat false because, of course, one
chooses generally to be a clinician and generally one chooses to be a clinical student. On
the other hand its not clear from my conversations over the years with clinical students
and clinical teachers that anyone ever really thinks about these issues before deciding to
become a clinical student or clinical teacher.
15. See GEOROErOWN UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR APPLIED LEGAL STUDIES OFFICE
MANUAL, ch. 9, 1-15 (1984) [hereinafter CAIS MANUAL]. I support grading in the clinic
with the same reservations as described in the CALS Manual. I believe grading clinic work
gives positive messages to students about the value of clinical work as compared to other
coursework.
16. See note 47 and accompanying text.
17. Teachers of Women's Studies remind us that this is not necessarily so. Frances
Maher, Classroom Pedagogy and the New Scholarship on Women, in GENDERED SUBJECTS:
THE DYNAIncs OF FEmnST TEACHING 29, 44-45 (Margo Culley et al. eds. 1985); Contract
grades, self grading, and group grading are common within women's studies courses. We
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Law teachers grade students privately, even secretly, and are loathe to
reveal their process to students. Not surprisingly, grading is the pre-
rogative of the teacher which gives her the most power over her students,
and is fraught with potential for harm. My colleagues and I at Brooklyn
Law School, and most clinicians I know, devise methodologies to further
distance ourselves from the process of grading in an effort to secure
fairness in the process.'8
have never adopted any of these methodologies in the clinical program I teach, nor do
I necessarily advocate doing so. I had only one experience with self-grading as a student,
and I gave myself an A, though I doubted I deserved one.
However, in the clinical program I teach, we did experiment one semester, with
giving the students the opportunity, if they wished, to grade themselves for their clinic
work. We asked the students to write down, if they wished, the grade they felt they
deserved for their clinic work, to put what they had written in a sealed envelope and
leave it for us. We indicated we would not look at the student's self-grade until we had
completed our grading that semester, and that we certainly would not lower a student's
grade based on what they had given themselves. Very few students (only two of twelve)
took us up on our offer. Neither student's grade was effected by the grade he gave
himself.
18. See Patricia Cain, Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist Theory and
Judging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1945, 1946 (1988) (suggests that such methods spare us the
pain of judging).
I keep charts of my students' attendance in the clinic seminar and records of their
homework assignments, which I scrupulously assign values to. I review my student's time
sheets each week. I keep records (some of my colleagues keep journals) of my supervisory
interactions with students, and my colleague and I have developed a chart which includes
the qualities we value, weighted accordingly, and scrupulously fill in the chart as part of
our grading protocol at the end of each semester. Furthermore, I personally supervise
only half the students in my clinic; my colleague supervises the other half. Thus, each
of us brings a more "distant" perspective to the other's students, which we call on to
help us in interpreting supervisory encounters and in evaluation.
While none of these techniques makes for a perfect grading process, they do offer
a more distant perspective on our students which serve the values of fairness, equality,
freedom from bias and coercion which unchecked proximity might otherwise imperil.
Traditional legal scholars rely on rules to achieve the same result, while liberal feminists
argue that an integration of rule-based and care-based reasoning has a better chance of
doing so. RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND PROFESSIONAL DEcIsIoNs:
THE CHANGING VALUES OF WoMEr AND MEN LAWYERS 41 (1989) [hereinafter MORAL
VISION]; Judith Resnick, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for
Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1877, 1922-23 (1988).
Similarly, the proximity between clinical students and teacher helps break down
hierarchy and empower the student's voice. This in turn creates dialogue which exposes
the values of legal education, and informs the grading process by sensitizing us to the
power we hold over our students, the extent to which we accept the values which dominate
evaluation in traditional legal education, and requires us to refine the terms and criteria
we use in the "distancing methodologies" described above. One of the things I learned
about our grading process, for instance, is that we often valued students with strong
abstract reasoning and written communication skills more highly than we valued students
with strong interpersonal skills. Once this bias was revealed, we tried to compensate for
[Vol. 27.:115
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As grading imposes distance, it inhibits the development of intimacy.
Grading may affect the trust a student is willing to place in his teacher.
Having discussed grades with both clinical and nonclinical students, my
clinical students are more likely to interpret a disappointing grade as a
breach of trust. Grading also complicates self-disclosure. Students worried
about a "good grade" may be less willing to be critical of themselves,
the teacher or the clinic for fear of reprisal.
2. Mutuality.-By mutuality I mean that there is generally an element
of reciprocity in clinicians' relationships with their students, more so
than in most relationships between traditional teachers and students. For
example, a clinician may not only refer to students by their first names,
but permit students to call her by her first name as well, even in an
environment where most non-clinical teachers are referred to as "Pro-
fessor." Similarly, clinical teachers not only expect their students to
make self-disclosure as part of their pedagogy, teachers make it as well.' 9
Mutuality contributes to a reduction in hierarchy between teacher and
student. Since relationships between subordinate and superior are char-
acterized by asymmetry, to the degree a relationship is mutual it is a
more equal relationship.
A clinical relationship that is less hierarchical can act as a motivator
for some law students. 2° I am convinced that this is related to the fact
that much of law school is so hierarchical, with students so frequently
close to the bottom of the hierarchy, that a more egalitarian clinical
relationship generally feels empowering in contrast. 21
There is a good deal about the clinical relationship that is not
mutual, however. Students do not have the. power to grade teachers,
for example, no matter how egalitarian their relationship otherwise may
seem. Furthermore, although clinical methodology may encourage stu-
dents to critique their supervisor's ideas and lawyering, this critique does
not have the same harmful potential that grading holds for students.
Finally, even to the extent the relationship is a mutual one, often the
19. Jean Koh Peters has suggested two other forms of mutuality that characterize
the clinical relationship: mutuality of fulfillment and mutuality of learning. By mutuality
of fulfillment she means that students and teachers are mutually invested in the success
of the experience; students look forward to learning and recognize that the teacher's
observation of their learning is an important part of her satisfaction. By mutuality of
learning she suggests that students and teachers learn from each other; teachers teach
students about lawyering and students teach their teachers about lawyering and teaching.
Letter from Jean Koh Peters, on file with the author.
20. See, e.g., Jane H. Aiken, David A. Koplow, Lisa G. Lerman, J.P. Ogilvy &
Philip G. Schrag, The Learning Contract in Legal Education, 44 MD. L. Rnv. 1047, 1049,
1056 (1985) [hereinafter The Learning Contract].
21. Michael E. Carney, Ph.D., Narcissistic Concerns in the Educational Experience
of Law Students, J. PsYcH. & L. 9, 27 (Spr.-Sum. 1990).
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supervisor sets the tone. I usually give students permission, for example,
to call me by my first name.n
3. Trust.-Trust is dependence on the good will of another. 23 To
some extent, clinicians can fairly be said to be engaged in vicarious
lawyering, that is, that clinicians lawyer through their students. If for
no other reason, trust is an important feature of the clinical relationship. 24
The process of clinical teaching requires that the clinician trust the
student sufficiently to lawyer in her name and yet respect the student's
autonomy and his relationship with his client to the greatest degree
possible.
Similarly, the process of clinical teaching to some degree assumes,
perhaps naively, that the student trusts the teacher. 2 If a clinical teacher
models a lawyering activity and asks for the student's feedback, she
tries to develop in the student sufficient trust that the student can honestly
disclose his feelings without fear of reprisal or ridicule. 26 To the extent
the pedagogical goals of certain clinical programs include attention to
the interpersonal aspects of lawyering, the importance of trust is height-
ened.2 7
Although trust helps create intimacy, it does not necessarily reduce
hierarchy. In fact, trust exists in profoundly unequal relationships such
as master and servant.n Trust can also be involuntary. Mothers, for
instance, trust in the goodwill of child care providers because they have
22. Actually, I have adopted a number of different postures toward the issue of
what my students call me. I find I am most comfortable saying nothing about it, and
letting the student decide what to call me as our relationship evolves. [It often takes
students a while to get around to calling me by my first name.] This is probably the
least comfortable choice for students. In the years where I have made a choice not to
say anything about the issue of names, I frequently find that a student (generally a white
male student) will ask, "What should we call you?" Although it is framed as a question,
I always feel called on my attempt at a power play.
23. Annette Baler, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETmcs 231, 235 (1986).
24. See note 94 and accompanying text for examples illustrating the importance
of trust in the relationship between clinical students and teachers.
25. Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Shrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 10 (1978) (describing an exercise clinical teachers attempted to use with limited
success because of student reticence to disclose personal information about themselves).
26. Trust is reciprocal; psychological studies show that "the more trusting we are,
the more likely we are to be trusted by others." Cary S. Avery, How Do You Build
Intimacy in a Age of Divorce? PSYCHOL. TODAY, May 1989, at 29.
27. The Center for Applied Legal Studies at Georgetown University, for example,
makes attention to the interpersonal aspects of lawyering an explicit goal of the program.
See infra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
28. Baer, supra note 23, at 247 (Baler argues that traditional descriptions of trust
placed too heavy emphasis on analogies to contract. Contract notions may adequately
explain trust that exists between actors of equal power, but does not adequately explain
the trust between actors of superior and inferior power.).
[Vol. 27:115
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no alternative, because "no one is able by herself to look after everything
she wants to have looked after." 29
Because self-disclosure, proximity and mutuality in the clinical re-
lationship make students and teachers more vulnerable to harm by one
another than is the case in the non-clinical classroom, the need for trust
is heightened. As the teacher and student must trust each other, however,
they must not trust so much that they fall to be critical of each other.30
Psychological studies of couples involved in intimate relationships
suggest that trust can be so complete as to fail to see areas for im-
provement.3' Even when one perceives an area for improvement, trust
may act as a barrier to communicating that perception.3 2 A clinical
teacher's need to give and receive feedback thus requires that there be
some limits on the trust her students place in her and that she places
in them.
For instance, I would think there was something amiss if my students
trusted my judgment unquestioningly. Indeed, I consider the student's
ability to engage in a meaningful dialogue with his supervisor over
strategic or professional responsibility issues in a case to be a sign of
the student's growth. This kind of discussion seems helpful to the extent
student and supervisor trust each other, and threatening to the extent
they do not.
4. Setf-Disclosure.-Disclosure is key to the development of inti-
macy. 33 Self-disclosure involves revealing personal and other information
about oneself to another. 34 For a teacher, self-disclosure is often con-
scious, as when I answer students' questions about my background, or
share my own uncertainty about how to proceed in a particular situation.
Much of my self-disclosure, however, is unconscious, even inadvertent,
as when I talk to my husband, my mother or my caregiver over the
29. Id. at 236.
30. This is one example of the dialectical relationship between connection and
separation. See discussion note 57.
31. John K. Rempel & John Holmes, How Do I Trust Thee, PSYCHOL. TODAY,
Feb. 1986, at 28.
32. Id.
33. Fried, supra note 9.
34. See Bernadette Mathews Ph.D., The Role of Therapist Self-Disclosure in Psy-
chotherapy: A Survey of Therapists, 32 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 521, 523 (1988) (self
disclosure is "the process of making "the self known to other persons"); Miller, supra
note 1, at 91-92; (surveying various definitions of disclosure); John M. Curtis, Indications
and Contraindications in the Use of Therapist's Self-Disclosure, 49 PSYCHOL. REP. 499
(1981) (Self-disclosure represents the "act of imparting personal or private informa-
tion. . ."); Paul C. Cozby, Self-Disclosure: A Literature Review, 79 PSYCHOL. BULL. 73
(1973) (self-disclosure is "any information about himself which Person A communicates
verbally to Person B").
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telephone within earshot of my students, or when my students sense my
uncertainty about how to proceed in a case despite my best efforts to
conceal it."
Students also disclose personal information about themselves to me,
both consciously and inadvertently: I often know, for instance, about
my students' family backgrounds and career plans, whether they are
married, their sexual preferences, and whether they are applying for and
their success at obtaining jobs. I also know (or will eventually learn)
whether they are passive rather than disinterested, or unaware rather
than arrogant or insecure rather than overly self-confident. I know when
they are angry with me or each other. I have enough contact with my
students so that sometimes I can see patterns in their behavior, as they
sometimes see patterns in mine. 6
As my experience with my students at the coffee hour reminds me,
however, one-sided disclosure does not always yield intimacy. In fact,
without intimacy, disclosure often seems inappropriate. By sharing pic-
tures of my daughter with my students I did not forge an intimate
relationship with them. Indeed, had I passed around the pictures in a
class of 150, I would have achieved even less intimacy, although I
probably would have felt more exposed.3 7 On the other hand, disclosure
often encourages disclosure in others.38
35. In the context of therapy, one therapist has noted that "we are, in fact,
revealing ourselves all the time, whether we do so deliberately or not. Even the most
distant therapist is, despite his judgment and training, leaking his personality into the
therapeutic process." Miriam Greenspan, Should Therapists Be Personal? Self-Disclosure
and Therapeutic Distance in Feminist Therapy, THE DYNAMIcs OF FEMINIST THERAPY 5,
9 (1986). This observation seems applicable to the relationship between the clinical supervisor
and student.
36. At the end of one term, for example, my students told me that my favorite
expressions were, "How are you feeling about .. ?" and "Am I making any sense?"
37. Again, I think this depends, to some extent, on the speaker's purpose in making
the disclosure and the relationship between the purpose and the disclosure.
I have been on the receiving end of a speaker's self-disclosure to a large audience.
At the plenary session of the 1990 Annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, a panel of speakers shared personal experiences of being different from others
in their legal institutions. Although each of the speakers incorporated personal narrative
compellingly into their presentations, I felt that one speaker made the most intimate self-
disclosures. He spoke of his sexual identity, and how it felt to be a gay man in an
academic institution and in the legal profession.
Although I was powerfully moved by this speaker's self-disclosure, I certainly did
not and do not feel particularly intimate with him. And yet in the question and answer
session following the presentation, many of those who spoke shared their personal ex-
periences, and it was clear that the generally impersonal, harried, chaotic AALS convention,
had at least temporarily, been transformed into something more intimate.
38. Connie DeForest & Gerald L. Stone, Effects of Sex and Intimacy Level on
Self-disclosure, 27 J. Couus. PsycH. 93 (1980); Paul C. Cozby, Self-Disclosure, Reciprocity,
and Liking, 35 SocioMEaTY 151 (1972).
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Perhaps it is because of the simultaneous need for distance in student-
teacher interaction, that defining the parameters of the intimacy clinical
teacher and students may share is such a complicated task. For example,
self-disclosure can be an important pedagogical tool for the clinical
teacher, but so is withholding disclosure. There are times when the
teacher should not share her experience, but listen for that of the
student.3 9
Furthermore, assuming the value of self-disclosure as a pedagogical
tool, there are limits on the kind of information one shares with one's
students. One does not, for example, tell one's students about one's
miscarriages or extra-marital affairs. 40
In some sense, in any relationship, we are revealing ourselves all
the time, regardless of what we choose to "disclose." Clinical teachers
and students, for example, reveal themselves to each other unconsciously
and nonverbally through their patterns of interaction. These interactions
can contribute to a sense of intimacy. Depending on what each holds
back, and the perceptions of the receiver, the image one projects to the
other can be incomplete and even distorted.
At least theoretically, however, it is the sorts of voluntary, conscious,
verbal disclosures4 , which we have the most control over, and which
have the potential to deepen the intimacy of our relationships. Because
of this, much of the discussion which follows focuses on this type of
disclosure.
Disclosure as it relates to the relationship between clinical teachers
and students can be categorized as follows: personal (sharing information
about oneself); professional (sharing information related to one's role
as a lawyer); and pedagogical (generally, revealing the reasons behind
teaching or supervisory choices).
To some extent, clinicians consciously employ disclosure (sometimes
making it, but more often asking students for it) as a pedagogical tool.
39. Ann Shalleck, in an article on clinical supervision, calls this respecting the
integrity of the student's process by letting it be sometimes. See generally Ann Shalleck,
Clinical Supervision in Context: From a Case to a Vision 120 (1990) (unpublished man-
uscript). See also infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
40. One legitimately might make such a disclosure. See, e.g., Robin West's disclosure
of her sexual promiscuity in The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives. Robin West, The
Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal
Theory, 3 Wis. WommN's L.J. 81, 101 (1987). West's self disclosure was connected to
her thesis; it made a point, as it were, and I suppose that makes it legitimate to me.
41. What I mean by verbal disclosure is disclosure involving language; I include
therefore the kind of written disclosure reflected in this article, as well as the disclosure
students often reveal in journals they keep as part of their clinical experiences. See, e.g.,
Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive
New Age Public Defender, 28 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 1 (1993) (examples of the
remarkably personal disclosure students make in journals).
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There are many, varied goals for clinical legal education articulated by
clinical teachers: to teach students lawyering skills,42 to teach something
broader about the legal system and the role of lawyers in the system,43
to teach students about the role of interpersonal dynamics in lawyering,M
or to teach the importance of serving clients. 4 Regardless of the individual
clinical teacher's goal, the primary focus of clinical legal education, and
in a larger sense every clinical teacher's goal, is to teach students how
to learn from experience. 46
Most of what "teaching students how to learn from experience"
means is teaching students to be reflective. Much of the way clinicians
teach students to be reflective involves disclosure. Clinical teachers fre-
quently ask students to reflect on an experience, and disclose that
reflection; often clinical teachers model that reflection.
Modeling self-reflection is risky, and has the potential to undermine
the teacher's authority. 47 To model self-reflection, therefore, requires not
only self-disclosure, but trust (i.e. the teacher has to trust her students
to some extent). Similarly, a student's ability to engage in self-reflection
is enhanced to the extent she can trust and reveal herself to the teacher
and others. 4
Often clinical teachers employ the evaluation process to teach self-
reflection to their students. 49 Like the clinical relationship itself, evaluation
42. See generally Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Course Design and the Supervisory
Process, Asuz. ST. L.J. 277-85 (1982) [hereinafter Course Design]; Peter Toll Hoffman,
The Stages of the Clinical Supervisory Relationship, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 301, 312 (1986)
[hereinafter Stages].
43. See generally Shalleck, supra note 39; Panel Discussion: Clinical Legal Edu-
cation: Reflections on the Past Fifteen Years and Aspirations for the Future, 36 CAri.
Ubav. L. REv. 337, 349-51 (1986) (comments of Elliot Millstein).
44. See, e.g., The Learning Contract, supra note 20; CALS MuAL, supra note
15, at ch. 6.
45. See, e.g., Gary Palm, Message from the Chair, NEwsTrraa oF TH SEcTIoN
oN CNmcAL LEoAL EDUCATION (American Association of Law Schools (AALS), Wash-
ington, D.C., 1986).
46. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st Century Perspective,
34 J. LEGAL EDuc. 612, 616 (1984).
47. Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPREsENTATioNs
162, 168 (Spr. 1990). "We indicate respect for a person by acknowledging his territory;
conversely, we invite intimacy by waiving our claims to a territory and allowing others
to draw close." (quoting Robert Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community
and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 973 (1989)).
48. It has been suggested that self-disclosure encourages the development of trust.
Mathews, supra note 34, at 523; But see, Fred W. Vonderacek & Marilyn J. Marshall,
Self-Disclosure and Interpersonal Trust: An Exploratory Study, 28 PSYCHOLOGIcAL REPORTS
235, 238 (1971) (testing failed to demonstrate any relationship between interpersonal trust
and self-disclosure).
49. Nina W. Tarr, The Skill of Evaluation as an Explicit Goal of Clinical Training,
21 PAc. L.J. 967, 972 (1990).
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has components both of intimacy and distance. Most clinicians conduct
face-to-face evaluations with their students, not unlike the mid-semester
evaluation described above. These face-to-face meetings feature, at least
aspirationally, openness and frank reflection by the student on her
strengths and weaknesses, and supportive and frank response by the
supervisor. To the extent the aspiration is achieved, the evaluation process
is characterized by some degree of intimacy.
However, I have sometimes found myself trying to impose distance
between myself and a student in these meetings, particularly when I
found a student unwilling to be self- reflective. Instead of connecting
with or supporting the student, sometimes I need to be more austere
to motivate the student to think more critically about his actions.
Many clinicians ask students to keep journals during their clinical
experience, and most clinicians read and comment on student journals.
Students are encouraged not only to report on their experiences in the
clinic, but also to share their reactions and feelings about those expe-
riences.
Although I haven't surveyed clinicians on this, I suspect that most
clinicians find pedagogical disclosure most often legitimate and purely
personal disclosure most often illegitimate. Furthermore, even as I present
this taxonomy I question its utility. I can conceive of many examples
that do not fall neatly into these categories. [The lines blur for me, for
example, in the story that starts the "dilemmas" section.] 50
Choices clinicians and students make to disclose or withhold dis-
closure are central to the development of intimacy between them.sl Of
all of the various aspects of intimacy, disclosure is, at least potentially,
the one over which I have most control. It is perhaps because of this
that my most troublesome supervisory dilemmas seem to revolve around
power and control issues, and often involve questions concerning dis-
closure.
B. The Dilemmas Disclosure Poses for Clinical Teachers and
Students
One of the students in my clinic was the father of two young
children. During the early part of the semester, although he and his
partner were working hard and capably, I felt this student was devaluing
certain aspects of the work I deemed important. He was not keeping
file memos, for example; in part as a result, I felt that I was out of
50. See infra note 113 and accompanying text for an example of disclosure that
I felt was simultaneously personal, professional and pedagogical.
51. But see supra note 48.
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control of the team's work and that the student and his partner were
too independent.
The student always justified not having file memos completed because
he was too busy working on tasks he felt were more important. The
student and his partner were preparing for a deposition and drafting a
memorandum of law in an action in the United States District Court.
They were indeed working hard on these tasks, and the quality of their
work was quite high, although I kept feeling that the tasks could be
completed in less time than the students were taking.
- Soon, the student began to be late for supervision meetings and
once or twice attempted to reschedule a supervision session to accom-
modate some case-related work that "really needed" to be done. Having
attempted unsuccessfully to deal with these issues with the student over
the course of the semester, I raised them with him again during our
mid-semester evaluation meeting.
The student admitted that he was having difficulty, not only com-
pleting file memos on time, and fitting in supervision meetings, but
balancing his competing roles and getting his clinic work done efficiently
so that he could manage his family commitments. His wife had recently
resumed a career in journalism, having left her position as a newspaper
reporter to have children. She had contracted to write several articles
for major magazines, and my student had agreed to share child care
responsibilities so that she could meet her publication deadlines. Recently,
he had failed on several occasions to make it home from the clinic at
the agreed upon time to take over child care from his wife.
The student and I discussed whether the "important tasks" which
took up so much of his time were either so important or so time
consuming as to justify his delay in writing file memos or rushing
through or missing supervision meetings or indeed not getting home to
take over child care from his wife as he had promised. I believed that
it would enhance the student's ability to draft a memorandum of law
once he learned to spend less time on it. The close, painstaking detail
he brought to deposition preparation and briefwriting, while an important
perspective on lawyering-was only one perspective, and he needed to
be able to operate in more than one mode. I shared these beliefs with
the student.
I also believed that the student needed to balance his clinic obligations
better and that finding more time to care for his children would actually
enhance the student's lawyering skills.5 2 I realized, however, that I had
52. Ursula LeGuin offers that there ought to be something valuable we as primary
caretakers can bring to our writing because we are primary caretakers, and that the
caretaking work that we do becomes then not merely a distraction or an inhibition to
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strong motivation to believe this was true whether or not it was, since
becoming a mother had left me with fewer hours to devote to my own
teaching and lawyering work each day than had previously been the
case. I did not disclose my investment to the student, though he may
have sensed it anyway.
I identified strongly with the student's wife, and although the student
may also have sensed this, we did not discuss it explicitly. I worried
that revealing my own struggles with the equitable division of caregiving
would have undermined my credibility in urging the student that the
ability to "let go" of certain tasks, and not to focus on some tasks to
the exclusion of others, was an important lawyering skill. I clearly saw
a connection between the student's behavior in the clinic and his de-
scription of his behavior at home. In focusing on his brief and deposition
to the exclusion of file memos and supervision meetings, I saw the
student defining his priorities by attending to the "power-enhancing"
work first. Similarly, by allowing the lawyering work in the clinic to
prevent him from getting home to do child care, he was according
priority to a more powerful role (lawyer) over a less powerful one
(caregiver). I worried, however, that revealing the connections I saw
would not only undermine my credibility and perhaps my authority with
the student but might interfere impermissibly in his personal relation-
ships."3
Although intimacy in all its various aspects creates dilemmas for
clinical teachers, the aspect I find consistently most troubling, or at least
most highly charged, involve issues of disclosure. This experience, for
example, illustrates at least four potential dilemmas that intimacy, pri-
marily the disclosure component of intimacy, poses for clinical teachers
and students. First, although the reduction of hierarchy is often an
our writing but something that enriches it. See Ursula LeGuin, The Fisherman's Daughter,
DANcINo AT THE EDGE OF THE WORLD 213, 228, 231, 236 (1989). Her words have encouraged
me to share my narrative about my first meeting with my students this semester. Similarly,
I felt that this student needed to see that being a good father did not require that he
sacrifice being a good lawyer, rather, that being a good father enhanced his ability to
be a good lawyer.
53. The issue of whether to reveal personal connections to a student is a familiar
dilemma in the therapist/patient relationship. For example, one therapist found that
revealing he was divorced hindered his ability to assist married couples. Mathews, supra
note 34, at 527. On the other hand, Miriam Greenspan discovered that sharing her pain
over her child's death helped clients explore numerous issues upon learning of her vul-
nerability. Greenspan, supra note 35, at 15. Greenspan cautions, however, that therapists
"must guard against talking about ourselves as a way of emotionally unloading in a
relationship that is safe for us precisely because we have considerable power in it." Id.
at 7. This warning could also apply to the relationship between the clinician and the
student.
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explicit goal of a clinician's more intimate relationship with her students,
there may be times when she wants and needs to call on her authority,
particularly where the student's standards of practice seem to be lacking.
In my example with my student, if I couldn't convince him that file
memos were as important as briefs and depositions, then I wanted him
to pay more attention to file memos, because I said so. Does intimacy
make it harder for a clinician to call on her authority? If so, should
clinicians avoid intimacy unless the student has assimilated the models
of competent lawyering the teacher is trying to impart? Is a more intimate
approach only pedagogically justified when the student proceeds to cri-
tique those models, or to learn self-reflection?
These questions imply that intimacy can be controlled, and a corollary
to my assertion that clinical teaching is fraught with potential for intimacy
is that frequently it cannot be. When I initiated my discussion with my
student, I did not expect to learn anything about his home life. I have
limited ability to control the patterns of interaction that led this student
to reveal a personal problem to me.
Third, intimacy can be intrusive, both for the teacher and for the
student.5 4 There are times when a student's learning may be enhanced
by a clinician's disclosure that a particular issue may be difficult for
her as well, but the clinician may not feel like sharing that issue with
that particular student at that particular time. In the example above,
even if it would have enhanced the student's learning to disclose my
own struggles balancing child care with my lawyering and teaching
responsibilities, I didn't want to reveal those things to that student at
that time. Similarly, even if it enhanced the student's learning to make
connections between the issues in his lawyering and the issues in his
personal life, does the clinician have any right to comment on the latter?
Finally, even though intimacy has the effect of reducing hierarchy,
the clinician inevitably retains more power in the relationship than the
student. What do we do with students who don't want to be intimate?
In the example above, in some sense, the student "voluntarily" disclosed
information about his relationship with his spouse. Had I wanted to
engage the student more on his role as a father and spouse and the
connections to his lawyering, how could I have been assured that the
student didn't feel coerced into discussing his personal life with me?
Clinicians expect their students to be self-reflective. The extent to which
a student can reflect critically is often the basis for evaluation in clinical
programs. How do clinicians guard against coercing trust and self-
disclosure from their students?55
54. See The Learning Contract, supra note 20, at 1063, 1078.
55. One of the risks of disclosure (and maybe the other aspects of intimacy) is
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II. THE ROLE OF DiSCLOSURE IN THE LiTrAuR ON CLINICAL
SU ERVISION
Nearly all clinicians employ some disclosure in clinical teaching, even
if it is only the sort of pedagogical disclosure described above.5 6 The
written literature on clinical supervision reflects some of clinician's choices
concerning disclosure and the range of differences among clinicians
concerning these choices. The literature on clinical supervision also reveals
some of the dilemmas clinicians may experience around issues of dis-
closure.
At the Center for Applied Legal Studies (CALS), a clinical program
of Georgetown University Law Center, clinicians employ a learning
contract as part of their clinical supervision.57 The adherents of the
contract approach describe educational goals emphasizing the interper-
sonal aspects of lawyering: helping law students learn to accept re-
sponsibility, teaching problem-solving through reflection on the process
of decision making, teaching collaboration, and exploring students' value
choices. 58
The learning contract is individually negotiated between a supervisory
team and each pair of student interns. The contracting process consumes
the first two to three weeks of each semester, thus shaping the supervisor
and student's interactions with each other from the beginning of their
relationship. At the beginning of the semester, the students receive a
draft contract, prepared by the clinic faculty, which contains some
standard provisions; the students meet their supervisors at the first
contract negotiating session having considered the draft contract, ready
to propose additions, modifications, or deletions.
One of the explicit goals of the contracting process is to reduce,
though not eliminate, the hierarchy inherent in the student-teacher re-
lationship. The contract defines, for example, the roles the supervisor
is willing to play with the student, by encouraging certain descriptive
names for supervisors (advisors, resources, catalysts and process con-
sultants) and discouraging certain others (bosses, partners, and leaders).
Only rarely and with reluctance have supervisors been willing to contract
for higher status roles.5 9
The contract also sets certain ground rules for interaction between
student and supervisor. For example, because CALS is designed to teach
that it can become indulgent of the supervisor's needs for approval or closeness and
harmful to the student or at least not in her best interest. See, e.g., Mathews, supra note
34, at 530.
56. See note 37 and accompanying text.
57. See generally The Learning Contract, supra note 20.
58. Id. at 1048-50.
59. Id. at 1059-61.
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students about the interpersonal aspects of lawyering, the learning con-
tract generally contains a provision permitting the supervisors to comment
on group process or interpersonal dynamics.60 As is the case with the
contract terms defining the relationship, to the extent a particular team
of students wants to remove this standard term from its individual
contract, the faculty "bargain hard" to keep it in. Another standard
contract term prohibits any case-related discussions between students and
teachers unless all members of the case team are present. 6'
The gendered dimensions of disclosure are revealed in the clinic's
experience with the proscription on substantive discussions without the
entire case team being present. The faculty identified this as the only
contract term faculty breach with any regularity. 62 Women supervisors
particularly had trouble refusing students' requests that they speak with
them. Perhaps not coincidentally, the women supervisors had less status
than the male supervisors. (The women supervisors were LLM candidates
who were themselves interning in the clinic, whereas most of the male
supervisors were members of the tenured faculty.)63
It is not only the substantive contract terms, but the contract ne-
gotiating process itself that shape the interactions, and patterns of dis-
closure, between students and teacher. For example, the standard contract
form requires students to disclose their learning goals. Faculty do not
disclose similar learning goals, and have resisted students' efforts to
require them to do so. The CALS faculty recognize that the lack of
parallel disclosure reinforces the hierarchy between student and teacher,
but are content to allow this much hierarchy to exist. It is important,
they argue, to recognize the real power disparities between student and
teacher that the contracting process cannot eliminate 4
I am again struck by the acknowledged relationship between dis-
closure and power, and the supervisor's unwillingness to relinquish that
power, even in a clinic which aspires to reduce hierarchy. It reminds
me of my discomfort after revealing my baby pictures to my students
at my first meeting with them, and how vulnerable I felt having thereby
undermined my "professorial authority" on the first day. I wonder
60. Id. at 1060.
61. Id. at 1071.
62. Id. at 1073.
63. Id. at 1073, n.86.
64. See generally The Learning Contract, supra note 20, at 1053-61. Some students,
acknowledging the relationship between self disclosure and power, have pointed out that
this asymmetry gives the instructors more power in the process. The faculty, insisting that
the instructor's power is real, resisted the students' effort to force the instructors to
articulate learning goals for themselves in the contract, lest this very real power disparity
be obscured.
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whether CALS' explicit focus on the interpersonal dimension of lawyering
and reducing hierarchy heightens the sense of vulnerability for their
clinicians, and makes them more likely to draw lines that may seem
less risky to other supervisors. For example, other clinicians explicitly
share learning goals with their students early in the semester, and do
not feel their authority unacceptably undermined thereby.65
In another approach to clinical supervision, Peter Hoffman has
advocated a three-staged model of clinical supervision: in the first stage,
the supervisor is more didactic and directive, since the student needs
substantial guidance; in the second stage the supervisor works to nurture
the student's confidence in his own decision-making ability, by treating
the student less directively and more as an equal; in the final stage,
since the supervisor and student are more like peers, the supervisor
defers to the student's judgment and intervenes only to prevent serious
error . 6
In describing the stages of clinical supervision, Hoffman addresses
two types of disclosure which play a role in his model of supervision:
pedagogical and professional. Hoffman advocates disclosing the super-
visory model to the students, arguing that such disclosure "motivates"
students to proceed through the various stages. 67 This disclosure of one's
teaching goals is what I previously referred to as pedagogical disclosure.
It is interesting, and true, in my experience, that many students are
motivated to perform well by the prospect of becoming the teacher's
peer. I also think that for many students becoming the teacher's peer
means more than simply becoming more proficient at a set of technical
skills. Becoming the teacher's peer implies a qualitative change in the
student's relationship with the teacher (and a corresponding increase in
the student's power) that many students may find attractive and mo-
tivating. I find that it is easier for me to be "friendly" and less guarded
with the students whom I judge to be performing well. I assume this
message is not lost on students for whom my approval or friendship is
a motivator. Perhaps the generally less personal and frequently alienating
environment of law school makes the prospect of a closer relationship
with a teacher seem like a particularly valuable commodity.
In his only concrete example of supervisory dialogue, Hoffman
provides an example of what I have termed "professional" disclosure.
In a discussion with a student during the second stage, Hoffman helps
a student explore options in response to a complaint in a personal injury
action. Hoffman tells the student, "I know the attorney for the other
65. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
66. Stages, supra note 42, at 309.
67. Id. at 311.
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side and I am pretty sure she will give us an extension of time to
answer."' '8 Like much professional disclosure, this seems relatively non-
controversial most clinicians would have no objection to doing it and
it reveals very little personal information.
Hoffman doesn't address disclosure directly, and talks more in terms
of authority and control versus openness and friendliness. However, this
model seems to recognize some need to balance the sorts of disclosures
that are implied in the supervisor's move from authority figure to peer,
with the need to remain in control, even at the final stage. I suspect
he would advocate caution in making personal disclosure, particularly
in the early stages of the supervisory relationship.6 9
I also find it somewhat telling that Hoffman's article is written in
a more abstract style than others who have written about clinical su-
pervision and, in some sense, discloses the least personal contextual
information. Just as my own more concrete and personal writing reveals
a somewhat greater willingness to disclose, the absence of examples that
reveal more about the author and his personal supervisory style reinforces
my feeling that Hoffman would be suspicious of a supervisor's disclosure
of personal information unrelated to her role as a lawyer.70
In another of the leading articles describing the process of clinical
supervision, Ann Shalleck describes a form of supervision that endeavors
to explore the connections between lawyering and the socio-political
context in which it operates. 71 She believes that any lawyering activity
can serve as a metaphor for the lawyering process generally, and argues
that subjecting any lawyering activity to intense scrutiny can illuminate
the lawyering process. Shalleck's description of her supervisory process
models her supervisory methodology: she constructs a theory of super-
vision by examining three supervisory interactions in a single clinic case,
and subjecting those interactions to intense scrutiny.72
68. Id. at 308.
69. I subsequently did send Hoffman a draft of this article and he generously
shared his reactions with me. While he acknowledged that for him "intimacy has not
been a particularly important part of the supervisory exchange," he regularly employs
connected, pedagogical disclosure. "'[Thinking aloud' including relating my emotional
reactions is valuable teaching by demonstrating or modeling what a good lawyer should
do in a particular situation." Letter from Peter Hoffman, on file with the author.
70. This may be another indicia of the significance of gender in clinical supervision.
See Henley, supra note 2, at 8. Hoffman thinks the style of writing reflects little about
his supervisory style and attributes the lack of personal examples to traditional law review
writing style and the pressures of supervision which at the time he wrote the article
precluded more expansive illustrations.
71. Shalleck, supra note 39.
72. The case of Jessica Green provides the setting for this analysis of supervision.
Ms. Green is a victim of domestic violence who seeks an order excluding her husband
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Like Hoffman, Shalleck advocates a form of pedagogical disclosure
where the supervisor makes the reasons for her choice of subjects to
discuss in a supervision session clear to the student. Shalleck's reason,
which is to motivate the student to be patient with the teacher's agenda,
is similar to Hoffman's. Shalleck acknowledges, however, that disclosing
the teacher's agenda has the potential to derail it by giving the student
the opportunity to challenge the project of the teacher, an opportunity
the student may not have had in the absence of the teacher's disclosure.
73
Implicitly, Shalleck acknowledges the relationship between hierarchy
and disclosure, and that the supervisor may, in the disclosure of her
teaching goals, relinquish some of her authority to her students. Hoffman
does not allow for this possibility as a consequence of the supervisor's
disclosure. But "allowing the student to transform the teacher's agenda"
is a much less risky proposition for Shalleck in the context of a single
supervisory encounter, than it is for Hoffman who, in disclosing to
students the stages of clinical supervision, is setting the ground rules
for the entire relationship. Presumably, if Shalleck, as a consequence
of her disclosure to her students, feels uncomfortable with the amount
of supervisory authority she has relinquished, she can try to make an
adjustment in the next encounter. Hoffman, in contrast, is talking about
a fairly critical moment early in the semester. Since his preferred method
of supervising his students is in some sense non-negotiable, his disclosure
of his methodology is not designed to provoke discussion, or permit
alteration of his agenda. The relationship between authority and disclosure
is not only that we disclose, but when and how.
On the other hand, Shalleck says that supervisor-student interaction
is not itself a focus for inquiry in her model of supervision.7 4 In this
way, Shalleck distinguishes her view of supervision from the CALS
model, where supervisor-student interaction is a focus for inquiry. Pre-
sumably then, Shalleck does not comment on supervisor-student inter-
action, and either explicitly or implicitly discourages students from doing
so.
This is another interesting choice, and while Shalleck doesn't provide
her reasons for it, one wonders about them. There are parallels, for
instance, in supervisor-student interaction and lawyer-client interaction. 75
from the marital residence and an order of support for herself and her children. Shalleck
describes three supervisory encounters (1) a meeting between the supervisor and Ms. Green's
student lawyers which precedes Ms. Green's hearing on her application for orders of
eviction and support, (2) the hearing itself, and (3) the supervision session which followed
the hearing. Shalleck, supra note 39, at 19-65.
73. Id. at 183.
74. Id. at 185.
75. See Peter Margulies, "The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of
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It is not necessarily inconsistent with Shalleck's methodology to examine
an interaction between supervisor and student. It could be a choice made
simply in the interest of efficient casehandling. Certain discussions have
greater potential to advance the casework than discussions of student-
supervisor interaction. Making certain subjects off-limits, and being the
one to say they are off-limits, reinforces the teacher's authority in a
way that willingness to talk about these issues would not.
Shalleck cautions supervisors to be vigilant constantly for ways in
which they "may be overpowering or subverting the student's experi-
ence." Although this comment is directed more at intervention generally
than at disclosure in particular, it provides another reason for a supervisor
to withhold disclosure.
Maybe there is less risk that the supervisor's disclosure will overpower
or subvert the student's experience where the supervisor has endeavored
to achieve a more egalitarian relationship with the supervisor. My students
urge me to share my feelings and reactions with them, to not hold back.
They insist that they can react critically to my ideas and they seem to
do so. Maybe this is all just my attempt to justify my own more
disclosing style, because the truth is it is often difficult for me to
withhold my own reactions. I often have very intense reactions to
experiences like the hearing described in Shalleck's article.7 6 Sometimes
my own insights seem so fresh and so urgent that it is difficult for me
to wait for a student to come to his own conclusions about it.
III. TiEs OF CONNECTION AND SEPARATION IN FEMINIST
SCHOLARSHIP AND THE INSIGHTS THEY OFFER CLINICIANS
Much of lawyering is a process of separation and connection; it is
the lawyer who can do both effectively who is the most successful
advocate. A lawyer is required in her relationship with her client, to
empathize, or connect in a fundamental way." A lawyer must, in order
the Unexpected": A Civic Republican View of Clinical Legal Education 8 (1993) (un-
published manuscript); Smith, supra note 41, at 56.
76. Shalleck's article describes a hearing in which her students represent a battered
woman in a proceeding seeking a protective order, an order excluding the abusive husband
from the home, and temporary support payments. The students succeed in getting the
order of protection excluding the husband from the home, and an order requiring the
husband to continue mortgage payments for ninety days. The judge refuses to order
support however, although the woman has two small children and does not work outside
her home. Shalleck, supra note 39, at 32-57.
77. Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell Me That?". Attorney-Client Delib-
eration Regarding Non-Legal Issues and the Interests of Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REv. 213,
229 (1990); DAvID A. BINDER, PAUL BEROMAN AND SusAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUN-
SELORS: A CLIENT CENTERED APPROACH at 32-45 (1991) [hereinafter LAWYERS AS CoUN-
SELORS]; see also Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HAsTiNGs L.J. 991, 1003
(1992).
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to be effective, be able to see a problem from her client's perspective,
even if that perspective is very different from her own. 78
In the clinic I teach, we represent clients seeking social security
disability benefits. I often observe students evaluating a client's disability
claim with reference to the way in which they or their parents, since
most of our disability clients are significantly older than most of our
students, would react if faced with similar physical challdnges. The
problem with this perspective is that it fails to account for the subjective
nature of pain79 indeed its severity, since students have not, in general,
experienced the pain their clients face.80 Often, though not always, the
student's perspective also discounts the demands of physical labor, and
the effects of racism, classism and sexism. To be truly empathetic, a
lawyer must be able to evaluate a case from her client's perspective."1
Simultaneously, however, a lawyer or advocate must also be able
to separate herself sufficiently from her client's perspective to be able
to subject the client's story to scrutiny, to gather facts in discovery, to
think about the most effective way to present the client's claim to third
parties such as judges and opposing parties. In the disability case, it is
important not to be so wedded to your client's perspective that you fail
to appreciate the initial hostility you may encounter from a judge or
agency representative.
I often find students who can either separate or connect very well,
but have trouble doing both well. Often issues of connection and sep-
aration seem related to gender.12 For instance, I often find students,
78. Clinical scholarship (particularly the Theoretics of Practice Movement), feminist
legal scholarship and critical race scholarship all emphasize the importance of considering
multiple perspectives; see Anthony V. Alfieri, Essay: The Politics of Clinical Knowledge,
35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 7, 15 (1990); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival
Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. Rv. 1, 31, 39-
40, 44, 45, 47, 50, 55-56 (1990); Mar Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HAv. Crv. RTS. Civ. LIB. 323, 325, 331, 359, 391 (1987);
Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Forward: Toward a Race - Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989); Ellman, supra note 77, at 1003.
79. Aubeuf v. Schweiker, 649 F.2d 107, 111-112 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979)); Ber v. Celebreeze, 332 F. 2d 293, 299 (2d
Cir. 1964).
80. See Jack B. Weinstein, Equality in the Law: Social Security Disability Cases
in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRAcusE L. REv. 897, 899 (1984) (eloquent discussion of how
disability cases pose similar dilemmas for judges).
81. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and
Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. Rv. 1599, 1618, 1622, 1625, 1649 (1991); Elman, supra
note 77, at 992; Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisfying and Productive
Process for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REv. 459, 475 (1992); PATRICIA J. WnIALS,
THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIomTs 212-13 (1991).
82. See generally CAROL GUoGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL DE-
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frequently, though not exclusively, white, middle-class male students,
who have trouble empathizing with their clients often poor, female, or
people of color. Occasionally, the same student is quite effective in
courtroom settings. I have had students who could, for example, stand
up to harsh and public criticism by a judge, and be totally unfazed,
yet have difficulty understanding a client's concerns. 3 Similarly, I have
had students who were quite empathetic and effective with clients, but
who were so conscious of the opinions of others that they were flustered
in the courtroom or even unable to speak in class for fear of their
classmates' reaction. Often, these are female students. I would be very
concerned how such a student would react in the face of a judge's
rebuke.
In the first case, the student's ability to separate himself from the
judge's perspective may be crucial to his ability to maintain his poise
in the courtroom and his ability to evaluate the judge's behavior critically
later. On the other hand, he was unable to connect with his client's
perspective sufficiently to understand him. In the second case, the student
was so connected to what her classmates thought that she was quite
literally unable to find her voice in the clinic seminar.
Some of the dilemmas surrounding intimacy for me involve questions
concerning when to attempt to connect with and when to separate from
my student's perspective. I am convinced, for example, that the students
I criticize as insufficiently empathetic are the same students I have trouble
empathizing with. And similarly, I wonder whether I need to "separate"
better from female students who have trouble doing so? In each case,
the ability to model connection and separation effectively imparts im-
portant lawyering messages for students.
I have found the metaphors of separation and connection helpful
in thinking about my relationships with my students, and in reflecting
on my choices concerning self-disclosure. Because feminists pose reso-
lutions of the tension between separation and connection, I have found
that feminism has been useful in resolving the tension I feel around
issues of intimacy and distance with my students.
That feminism offers clinicians assistance in analyzing the way in
which distance and intimacy operate in a clinician's relationship with
VELOPMENT AND MoRAL THEORY (1982); Bryant, supra note 81, at 479. But see Angela
Y. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 588,
591 (1980); CATmERaiN A. MAcKiNNON, FaImmmSm UNMODIFIED 8 (1987).
83. The judges in the United States District Courts where my students practice are
overwhelmingly white and male. Conceivably, the social class and power disparity between
the student and the client may be greater than that between the student and the judge,
making the judge seem not nearly as forbidding as he might to a student whose experiences
were closer to those of the client.
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her students should not come as a surprise. The epistemological and
methodological similarities between feminism and clinical teaching have
already been well documented. 4
What follows are three examples of models posed by feminists of
the resolution of separation and connection, and some thoughts from
my supervisory experiences concerning how these models might translate
for a clinician's relationship with her students.
A. Separation and Connection in Mothering and the Lessons for
Clinical Teaching
The feminist philosopher Sara Ruddick in her book, Maternal Think-
ing, 'offers an aspirational account of mothering and the distinctive
thinking that arises from the work mothers do."5 Ruddick identifies the
three essential tasks of mothering as: 1) preserving the child, 2) fostering
his growth and 3) socializing, or making the child acceptable to society. 6
In each of these tasks mothers are required to connect with and separate
from their children. It is in socializing, however, that the tension between
connection and separation is greatest.
Ruddick recognizes that mothers occupy positions which are simul-
taneously powerful, vis-a-vis their children, and powerless, vis-a-vis other
persons and institutions in society.Y Socializing therefore poses "painful
contradictions for mothers." 88 Mothers want their children to be able
to negotiate in the world without continually getting into trouble with
people who have the power to hurt them. At the same time, these
mothers may not want their children to accept society's dominant values
unquestioningly.
Mothers could, and often do, respond by viewing their children as
having essentially hostile natures that require domination and control.
They could, and often do, exert their maternal power and authority to
demand unquestioning obedience of the child. Children can also yield,
84. Goldfarb, supra note 81, at 1637-42.
85. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL TmH4IrNo: TOWARD A PoITIcs OF PEACE (1989)
[hereinafter RUDDICK]. The following discussion is drawn largely from Ruddick's work.
86. Throughout my discussion of Ruddick's work, I use the male pronoun to refer
to the child, and the female pronoun to refer to the mother. Ruddick consciously chose
to focus on "mothering" rather than "parenting" or "caregiving." Ruddick recognizes
that mothering is "potentially work for men and women," and that some men in fact
perform some mothering work. RUDDICK, supra note 85, at xi; 40.
87. Id. at 35. See also Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 46 U. MAiM L.
REv. 653, 654 (1992) ("[T]he symbol of Mother is negatively implicated by the specter
of her dependence on husband and child. She is married by burdens of obligation and
intimacy in an era where personal liberation and individual autonomy are viewed as both
mature and essential.").
88. Id. at 104, 109, 114, 115.
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just as unquestioningly, to the authority of fathers, school officials and
powerful others. Mothers can also completely accept their children's
behavior, without recognizing any need to control it, or fail to do so
despite recognizing the need.
Ruddick proposes an alternative form of socializing she calls "training
as a work of conscience," as a way of reconciling these contradictions.
The goal of this training is the growth of children as "conscientious"
persons, capable of judging against as well as with dominant values.
Ruddick's method requires "conversational reflection" in which the
mother, rather than dominating her child or accepting every behavior
without criticism, nurtures a responsiveness in him. This method requires
ongoing mutual trust; that is, the mother must trust her child to instill
the child's trust in her. This trust helps keep the dialogue from becoming
coercive, or at worst, minimizes the damaging effects of coercion. Trust
must not be so complete that a mother fails to recognize a child's
occasionally manipulative and meanspirited behavior, yet a mother must
not be forever suspicious of her child. Similarly, the child must be able
to recognize and protest his mother's betrayal in order to affirm that
she was once and will again be trustworthy. In order for this to happen,
a mother must acknowledge her failings and work against them. The
appropriate degree of trust then, is an ongoing struggle.
Training as a work of conscience forges a unity of goal and method.
A mother models the conscientiousness she tries to develop in her child.
When she seeks and trusts the authority of others, for example, she
takes responsibility for judgments of trust while keeping respectful dis-
tance from the authority judged trustworthy. This form of training
requires both intense connection as mother and child develop the bond
on which trust is based, and temporary, necessary separation as that
bond is tested when parent or child stand back to examine the other
critically.
Clinical legal education is often looked upon as the same sort of
"training" that mothers are called upon to do.8 9 For example, the legal
profession asks law schools to train students to be "acceptable" members
of the profession. Legal educators rail at this task, viewing their goal
not "training" as narrowly defined by the profession, but rather a
broader view of the educational mission.9 To the extent, however, that
89. These parallels between mothering and clinical supervision have also been
described in the therapist-client relationship. "The nature of the intimacy established
between a primary caretaker and an infant, as well as between a therapist and a client,
can be seen to involve the handling, within the relationship, of complex interrelated issues
around nurturing and individuation." Sandra Beth Levy, Toward a Consideration of
Intimacy In the Female/Female Therapy Relationship, 1 WOMEN & T3RAP Y 35, 37 (1982).
90. See generally Jack Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling: An Inquiry Into
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law schools attempt to satisfy the profession's expectations that law
students be trained, that task falls to clinical law teachers and teachers
of lawyering skills, who are often one and the same.
Furthermore, there are parallels between the simultaneously powerful
and powerless positions of mothers and those of clinical law teachers.
Supervision in the clinical setting, like mothering, is a conflictual status
of power and powerlessness. 9' Clinicians hold power over students but
often hold positions in the institution and the profession which are
relatively less powerful. 92
In the descriptions of clinical supervision in the literature on clinical
legal education, the clinical teacher hopes her student will acquire skills
necessary to succeed in the existing system while developing the tools
to critique both the system and her role in it to preserve the possibilities
for transformative change. 93 Similarly, when clinical teachers ask their
students to critique the models of lawyering they teach their students,
indeed when they encourage students to critique the teacher, they need
to create the trust that empowers the student's voice. Because of the
power disparities inherent in the student-teacher relationship, this trust,
like that between mother and child, is an ongoing and difficult struggle.
My interaction with one female student illustrates this struggle. The
student was drafting a complaint in a civil rights case. In reviewing the
draft, I emphasized the need for "spare" pleading which leaves open
as many options as possible in developing the case theory depending on
the facts learned in discovery. I also questioned the student's decision
to plead several harmful facts, since they were not necessary to establish
the cause of action. The student had included the harmful facts because
she felt that leaving them out gave the reader an incomplete and po-
tentially misleading understanding of what had occurred. The student
agreed to take out the harmful facts, although she questioned the honesty
the Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U.
L. RE,. 514 (1978).
91. As Fineman has noted with respect to mothers, it may be the burdens of
obligation and intimacy which effect the perceptions of clinicians in the institutions they
serve. Fineman, supra note 87, at 654.
92. Ruddick describes mothers as profoundly ambivalent about their conflictual
status. RUDDICK, supra note 85, at 68-69. Clinicians may be equally ambivalent. See David
Barnhizer, A Clinical Carol or the Spirit of Clinical Future, Remarks Before the Annual
Meeting of the Clinical Legal Education Section of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS), in AALS CLIICAL LEGAL EDUCATION NEWSLETTER, Mar. 1987, at 9.
(describing clinicians who lost touch with the reformist roots that originally brought them
to clinical teaching in the interest of becoming more powerful).
93. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Critiques of Clinical
Legal Education: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 287
(1986).
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of doing so, saying, "I'm becoming the kind of lawyer my mother
wouldn't approve of."
I was very troubled by this comment, never having perceived pre-
viously a conflict between honesty in advocacy and the rules of good
pleading. I thought, however, that while the student's view of honest
advocacy would disadvantage her client in the system as it currently
exists, the student and her mother may have had a point. I shared my
concerns with the student.
I told the student I thought it was important that she understand
how the system defined competent lawyering skills, while continuing to
look at the system as critically as she was. I also told her I was troubled
that I could be perceived as encouraging her to become the kind of
lawyer her mother would disapprove of, and that, apparently, I was the
sort of lawyer her mother would disapprove of.
I nevertheless felt that, having considered the options, including
whether we might look better to the court having pleaded the harmful
information and whether this outweighed the disadvantages of disclosing
the information, leaving out the harmful information was best for the
client. The student apparently felt the same. At least she said she did.
Thereafter, the student and I frequently engaged each other on the
"honesty" of various courses in litigation, using "how would your mother
react to the ethics of this?" as the standard.94
B. Integrating Connected and Separate Knowing and the Lessons for
Clinical Teaching
Women's Ways of Knowing,9 represents a groundbreaking attempt
to identify and categorize the different ways that women acquire knowl-
94. Robert Condlin might use this anecdote in his critique of live client clinicians'
use of "persuasion." Robert J. Condlin, "Tastes Great, Less Filling": The Law School
Clinic and Political Critique, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 45, 48 n.7 (1986). But see Eric S. Janus,
Clinics and "Contextual Integration". Helping Law Students Put the Pieces Back Together
Again, 16 WM. MrrcH. L. Ray. 463, 489, (1990) (criticizing Condlin as endorsing a false
objectivity).
I question whether persuasion would fairly characterize my interaction with this
student. For one thing, I continue to question the "conventionalness" of my choice; if
the student's mother truly believed the ethical course required disclosing the information,
why didn't I? The "maternal" standard here resembles that described by William Simon
as a regulator, one for whom duties to the system outweigh any duty of loyalty to the
client. See William Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1083,
1086 (1988) (My own instincts often tend toward those Simon would describe as "lib-
ertarian;" a libertarian would certainly leave the harmful information out, unless doing
so would harm her client.). Simon's model of Ethical Discretion might justify this decision
on the relative power disparities of the parties-the client for whom we were writing the
complaint was a poor woman and her adversary a powerful corporation.
95. MARY Fmm BELENKY, BLYTHE MCVICKER CuINcHY, NANcY RULE GOLDBERGER,
JiLL MATrUCK TARvLE, WOMMN'S WAYS op KNOWiNG (1986) [hereinafter Wom:N's WAYs].
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edge. For most women, according to the authors, higher education serves
a function of offering women formal structures for acquiring and an-
alyzing information. These formal structures can be of two types. One
type, "separate knowing" emphasizes critical thinking, looks for logical
inconsistencies, and extols reason. "Connected knowers" in contrast gain
knowledge through empathy; thus, they develop procedures for gaining
access to others' knowledge.
1. Separate Knowing and Traditional Legal Education.-Traditional
legal education privileges separate knowing. Most of law school, par-
ticularly in the first year, emphasizes abstract, decontextualized modes
of reasoning. 96 Even the traditional teaching of professional responsibility
emphasizes resolution of ethical dilemmas by reference to the Code of
Professional Responsibility, an abstract rule approach to the resolution
of problems often having moral dimensions. 97
Furthermore, the setting of such courses emphasizes the notions of
hierarchy, and exclusion of self that characterizes most courses in pro-
fessional responsibility, indeed much of law school. 9 Classes are taught
in large groups in raked lecture halls, lead by an "expert" professor
whose ability to know students personally or interact with them indi-
vidually, much less intimately, is limited by the number of students in
the class and the barriers imposed by the classroom design. 99
Even in the most "open" law schools, interaction between faculty
and students is limited by the size and design of most law school
classrooms. I have heard students, particularly in the first year, describe
the ring of students that forms around the professor after such large
classes. The students approach the professor with "questions" ostensibly,
although it sometimes seems that certain students long more for inter-
action with the professor than have a pressing need to have a question
answered. The "inner" ring is largely composed of students, who like
the professor, are often white, heterosexual, and male. Students of color,
gay and lesbian students, and women students approach the professor,
96. Himmelstein, supra note 90, at 534; Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The
Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299, 1305 (1988).
97. Id. at 520-21 (Jack Himmelstein notes that neither stricter ethical codes nor
courses on professional ethics address "a critical consideration of the lawyer's role, and
of the human and social concerns underlying that role."). See also Barbara Bezdek,
Reconstructing a Pedagogy of Responsibility, 43 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1159, 1162 (1992) ("The
effect, and it is fair to say the effort, is to separate the lawyer and her own ethical
sensibilities from the broader social work in which she will function.").
98. Id. at 533, 536-39; Weiss & Melling, supra note 96; Unhappily, this description
has also been applied to universities and colleges. Margo Culley, Arlyn Diamond, Lee
Edwards, Sara Lennox & Catherine Portugues, The Politics of Nurturance in GENDERED
SuJEcTs 11 (Margo Culley et al. eds. 1985).
99. See, e.g., Himmelstein, supra note 90, at 534.
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if at all, on the outskirts of the ring. As the professor runs out of time
to answer the questions of all the students, it is the students on the
outside which are most often left unaddressed.1'°
It is not surprising then, though it is ironic, that for many students,
their first individual conversation with a law faculty member who teaches
such a class is when and if the student meets with the faculty member
after she receives her final grade for the course.10' I recall overhearing
one student describe such a conference, "I never really spoke with [the
professor] before. I was so surprised to find out he was so nice."
Whether or not clinical students would describe their clinical teachers
as nice, they usually have some basis for making such a judgment before
they talk to her about their final grade.
2. Clinical Education and Connected Knowing.-In contrast to tra-
ditional legal education, clinical education emphasizes at least two modes
of teaching, both of which bring students into closer contact with their
professors. 10 2 Each of the modes of teaching in which clinicians are
engaged emphasize relationships with, 103 and among,' 4 students.
Most clinical programs include a classroom component which em-
phasizes more interaction among students and teachers than is the case
in the traditional classroom. 05 Clinical classes are generally smaller than
most non-clinical classes."' 6 There is generally more interaction among
students and between students and teachers than is the case in non-
clinical classrooms. Student teacher interaction is achieved in part by a
curriculum which encourages students to engage in simulations and role
plays and to critique their own performance and that of their classmates.
Students often receive individualized feedback on their performance in
role from teachers and classmates. The development and maintenance
of trust is an explicit goal of the clinical classroom.' 7
100. See Alice Dueker, Diversity and Learning: Imagining a Pedagogy of Difference,
XIX N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 101, 104-05 (1991-92).
101. See Carney, supra note 21, at 31 (an assessment of the effects of this form
of teaching on law students' mental health).
102. See Stages, supra note 42, at 301-02. See also The Learning Contract, supra
note 20, at 1051; Shalleck, supra note 37, at 2.
103. Shalleck, supra note 39, at 2.
104. Id. at 120.
105. Meltsner & Schrag, supra note 25, at 31.
106. Marjorie McDiarmid, What's Going on Down There in the Basement: In-House
Clinics Expand their Beachhead, 35 N.Y. L. Rav. 239, 254, 283 (1990) (comparing the
1:8 average student teacher ratio in in-house clinics to the 1:23 ratio in all other law
school courses).
107. While it has failed to overcome the bias of legal education or legal institutions,
clinical education has frequently challenged law schools to examine biases within law
school and the legal profession. See Susan J. Bryant & Victor M. Goode, Racism and
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The second mode of teaching in which clinical teachers are engaged,
one on one supervision, is at least as important as the teaching which
occurs in the classroom. In supervision, student teacher interaction is
even more individualized than in the clinical classroom. Most clinical
faculty have regularly scheduled meetings with the students they supervise,
either individually, or in groups of three or fewer. In addition to these
formal meetings, faculty interact with students informally on an almost
daily basis in the clinic office, or elsewhere, as the teacher assists the
student plan, reflect on or carry out lawyering activities. Relationships
between students and teachers inevitably develop through this daily in-
teraction.' 08
3. Constructed Knowing: Integrating the Voices.-In contrast to
knowing which is exclusively separate or connected, Women's Ways of
Knowing identifies a third form called "constructed knowing" which
represents a synthesis of separate and connected knowing. 109 Constructive
knowledge is characterized by an ability to relate with the information
learned and test it against one's experience and to take what is learned
outside oneself and compare it against an external standard. 10
Constructed knowing is promoted through teaching which models
for students a way of achieving the integration of connection and sep-
aration. "Constructive teaching""' acknowledges that students learn not
simply through the subject matter taught, but that teachers impart
important lessons through their interaction with students." 2 Constructive
teaching, therefore, includes opening up your process for the student's
Sexism and Their Effect on Supervision, PANEL DiscussIoN AT THm AALS NATIONAL
CmNICAL TEACHERS' CoNFERENcE (Colo., May 19, 1986); Mary Jo Eyster, Analysis of
Sexism in Legal Practice: A Clinical Approach, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (1988); Suellyn
Scarnecchia, Gender & Race Bias Against Lawyers: A Classroom Response, 23 U. MhcH.
J. L. Rnroam 319 (1990).
108. These relationships have the potential to respond to critiques of legal education
as destructive to law students' self esteem. Carney, supra note 21, at 10.
109. Weiss & Melling, supra note 96, at 1307, describe constructive knowers among
the women in their law school class "as [those who] know [they] can take any side of
a legal argument and knowing they want to now find the argument that [they] want to
believe in and then argue that."
110. It is unfortunate that Wo mN's WAYS of KNowING's categories take on a
hierarchical quality, that seems to reflect some class bias. Most of the examples of "Silent
Women," the lowest category, were lower class women. On the other hand, most of the
examples of "constructed knowers" were students at or graduates of "elite women's
institutions." WolmN's WAYS, supra note 95, at 93, 103, 131, 190-91.
111. Although the authors call this type of teaching "connected" I am avoiding
that term to emphasize the goal of truly integrating separate and connected knowing rather
than privileging connected knowing over separate. Id. at 223-29.
112. See Dueker, supra note 100, at 131 (arguing the value of connected teaching
in the law school classroom).
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scrutiny. Allowing a student to watch a teacher solve and fail to solve
problems can be a powerful learning experience, and empower students
to take on solving problems themselves.
I once supervised a student appellate argument in a case I had
supervised for a number of years. I had tried the case with different
clinic students a year earlier. We won a significant verdict at trial, only
to have the trial judge grant our opponent judgment notwithstanding
the verdict. As we got closer to the date of the appellate argument, I
became increasingly nervous. We had had a number of practice argu-
ments, and I was disappointed in the progress of the student's per-
formance. The student's performance was competent, and I had little
doubt he was capable of a good argument, but after each practice
argument, we talked about the changes we wanted to make in the next
practice argument, and few of those changes seemed to be getting made.
I was also having a very hard time restraining myself. I really wanted
to do the argument myself.
The day before the "real" argument, we had not scheduled a practice
argument, but I asked the student to meet with me anyway. We talked
about his expectations for the following day, summarized some of the
practice questions that had been especially difficult, and agreed on the
best way to approach those questions. During our conversation, the
student asked me whether it was difficult for me to let him do the
argument.
I could have deflected the question, saying, "that's what clinical
teachers always do," or minimized the issue saying, "It's always hard,
but's it's my job to help you do it, not to do it myself." Students have
asked me this question before. I had answered it similar ways in the
past and the answer usually seemed satisfactory-even true. Instead,
however, I admitted that it was especially hard for me to let go of this
argument, that I felt very committed to the client, and was very invested
in the outcome, probably more so than he.
I was concerned that my difficulty letting go of the argument not
become the student's problem, and I shared this concern with the student
as well. I was also concerned that the student not use my problem as
an excuse for disregarding my feedback. The student said he had sensed
my inability to let go of the argument in my supervision of him. While
this was undoubtedly true I told him, I was genuinely concerned that
he was not incorporating the feedback he had been receiving, and I
wanted him not to discount my suggestions just because I was also
having a problem letting go of the case.
The student's performance at oral argument the following day was
inspired, as good as any I have ever seen. There may well have been
no connection between our conversation, my disclosure, and his per-
formance. His performance may have been attributable to the "luck of
[Vol. 27:115
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the day," as his less successful performances in the practice sessions
may have been. Or it may be, as he assured me throughout the process,
that he could only "pull it together" at the last minute. It may be
however, that he needed to hear me acknowledge my difficulty letting
go, because he could hear it whether or not I acknowledged it.1'3 It
may be that he was so distracted by my obvious desire to do the
argument myself, it was difficult for him to focus on anything else. 114
The constructive teacher is one who helps students articulate and
expand their latent knowledge. The constructive teacher enters her stu-
dent's perspective, but does not abandon herself to it.11s Her role does
not entail power over students, but does "carry authority, an authority
based not on subordination but on cooperation." 116
A dilemma faced by a male student litigating a sexual harassment
case on behalf of a female client illustrates this integration of separation
and connection. The student was involved in face to face negotiations
to settle a pretrial order with his opponent, a male lawyer. During the
course of the negotiations, the lawyer repeatedly made disparaging re-
marks about the client's character, remarks which undoubtedly would
have offended the client had she heard them. Indeed the student admitted
that he had been offended by them, yet he said nothing to the lawyer.
In a subsequent supervision meeting, the student expressed disap-
pointment that he had not "defended" his client against his opponent's
remarks. He felt that in failing to respond, he had been disloyal to his
client.
I explored with the student the reasons for his reluctance to confront
the lawyer's disparagement of his client. The student felt he could not
respond to the lawyer's remarks without detracting from the completion
of the pretrial order. He felt it may even have been helpful to establish
113. LAwYERs As CoUsSELoRs, supra note 77, at 39.
114. At the risk of being criticized for justifying something that has good for me
as good for the student, once I acknowledged my difficulty "letting go" to the student,
I felt better able to do it. I think it is very possible that he couldn't do the argument
well until I moved out of his way. The student reflected some time afterward as follows:
"I can only agree that the reasons you offer are possible because I still have no idea
what the cause of my problem was. I would like to think that I knew I would "pull it
all together" in the end, but I know better. The pressure of the task was the most intense
I had ever experienced. I was frustrated that I was not performing up to your [or my]
expectations, knowing the substantial effort you had made for [the client] and that this
was her last chance in the courts. Your disclosure must have had some positive effect
on me based on my performance, but so many thoughts were running through my head
that I could not assign responsibility to a particular occurrence. Most likely, a part of
each of the possible reasons discussed played a role in the process." Letter from former
student on file with the author.
115. WoMEN's WAYS, supra note 95, at 227.
116. Id.
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an atmosphere where the lawyer felt free to make insensitive remarks
about the client. Permitting the lawyer to speak so freely might have
given the student an insight into the lawyer's theory of his case. He
also admitted, however, that his joint work with opposing counsel on
the pretrial order created a sort of allegiance with the lawyer that excluded
the client. Concerned about this, the student spoke to his adversary,
and the completion of the pretrial order was not adversely affected.
The student needed to be able to separate, or impose some distance
in his relationship with his adversary so he felt less reluctant to call
him on his inappropriate remarks. Or, conversely, he needed to be able
to maintain his connection with his client even though he was engaged
in the kind of lawyering task which normally requires one to separate
oneself from the client.
Paralleling the student's relationships with his client and his adver-
sary, the supervisor's relationship with the student needed to be suffi-
ciently close for the student to safely expose his misgivings about his
conduct with the lawyer, while distant enough to subject his actions to
scrutiny, with his supervisor's support.
C. Separation, Connection and the Integration of Justice and Care
The feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan in a work now familiar to
most law teachers identifies the different moral "voice," that often
characterizes women's decision making." 7 Whereas the leading theorists,
in particular the psychologist Lawrence Kohberg had hypothesized that
higher order moral decisionmaking required the application of a hierarchy
of abstract rules, Gilligan notes that these theories were reached through
studies of male subjects. In applying Kohlberg's research to women,
Gilligan uncovered a different mode of reasoning which emphasized
relationships over rules as a way of resolving moral dilemmas. Legal
scholars, in particular feminist legal scholars, have come to recognize
this "different voice" as an ethic of care.
In subsequent research, Dana and Rand Jack sought to elucidate
the lawyer's notion of professional responsibility by listening for justice/
rights (reasoning through resolution of competing abstract principles)
and care (reasoning through attention to self and other) themes in their
interviews of lawyers." 8 They concluded that the notion of ethics adopted
by most of the lawyers in their study included both justice and care
themes, and that these competing moral visions worked together for the
lawyers in their study in resolving moral dilemmas the lawyers encoun-
tered. They noted, however, that when particular ethical dilemmas brought
117. GauoA.N, supra note 82, at 24-63, 128-74.
118. MORAL VISION, supra note 18, at 13.
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justice and care concerns into sharp conflict the lawyers seemed to resort
primarily to one mode or the other to resolve the conflict. To this
extent, women were somewhat more likely to rely on the care mode to
resolve the dilemma, while men were somewhat more likely to rely on
the justice mode.
The effect of law school's emphasis on abstract analysis in producing
"detached, neutral, partisan stoics who think like lawyers and share the
assumptions of professional ethics" is well documented."19 In suggestions
for educating a "more morally responsive advocate," Jack and Jack
suggest reform of law school teaching methods, which in modeling
combative lawyering behavior, encourage the archetype of the adversarial
lawyer who approaches his professional role and the ethical dilemmas
he faces by resort to the rigid application of rules, without regard for
the morality he brought with him when he entered law school.
Furthermore, the separation of self which characterizes much of legal
education may give messages about the relationship between distance
and power which are mirrored in the legal system.'12 The higher status,
elite forms of practice (federal litigation, corporate deals, e.g.) are treated
as discrete bounded interactions, as compared to the "messiness" in-
dividual representation in family court, housing court, or criminal court
with its "recidivist" component.
The legal profession accords elite status not only to certain forms
of practice but to those lawyers with the means to distance themselves
from clients. Large law firms with legions of associates and staff divorced
from the actual client have more status, for example, than the solo
practitioner engaged in closer relationships with individual clients. The
federal prosecutor who is immune from the pressures of the community
is more powerful than the local district attorney. Indeed, arguably the
most powerful actors in the legal profession, judges, are the most distant.
Appellate judges are have more power than trial judges, and perhaps
not coincidentally are more distant from the controversies and litigants
they judge than are trial judges. The justices of the United States Supreme
Court are the most powerful actors in our legal system but are the most
distant from the litigants and controversies which come before them.12 ,
119. Id. at 44-45.
120. These messages are mirrored not only in legal institutions but in law itself.
See, e.g., Nedelsky, supra note 47, at 167 (a discussion of the preoccupation with
separateness and the pervasiveness of boundary metaphors in American constitutionalism).
121. Of course, distance and power are not synonymous, and the powerful actors
and institutions I cite are not powerful simply by virtue of their greater distance. But
the relationship between distance and power is more than coincidence and the ability to
distance oneself is one incident of power. The reaction of some of the Justices of the
Supreme Court to the release of Justice Marshall's personal papers suggests that the
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Feminist legal scholars remind us that traditional legal reasoning
denies the value of connection, intimacy and care, while feminists si-
multaneously celebrate connection and fear connection's invasive or op-
pressive potential. 12 As the aspiration toward explicit recognition and
integration of care based (connected) and rule based (separate) values
seeks to improve our legal system, a clinical teacher can integrate distance
with intimacy in her relationship with her students, as a check on
intimacy's oppressive or invasive potential.
To the extent that teaching methodology influences the kind of
professional who emerges, a point urged by Jack and Jack in their call
for reform of the law school curriculum, clinical pedagogy promotes
creative thinking which values divergent views and fosters cooperative
learning to a greater extent than the traditional law school methodology.
Thus, clinical teaching models for students a place for care values in
the legal curriculum, and by implication in their professional lives.
Furthermore, to the extent that clinical teachers engage in relation-
ships with students that are not only distant, but intimate, the meth-
odology of clinical teachers has a powerful potential for offering students
ways to integrate an ethic of care with an ethic of rights in their approach
to moral problems. The ethic of care requires neither the exclusion of
one's own needs, nor exclusion of the needs of others in resolving moral
issues. Clinical teachers by integrating both distance and intimacy in
their relationships with students, can offer a model for integrating "jus-
tice" concerns with care concerns-that care-based thinking, the con-
nected self, is no less just, and justice based thinking, the separate self,
is no less caring.
In urging that a course that looks and feels more intimate gives
positive messages about the value of care concerns in resolving moral
dilemmas it may be useful to share a conversation with a student I will
call Ellen. Ellen thought everyone in the clinic seminar regarded her as
"crazy" during a class discussion of whether to take a case involving
the government's attempt to seize the public housing apartment of a
women indicted on narcotics charges. Ellen had urged that the clinic
should accept the case because otherwise a woman and her two small
children would be rendered homeless; that is, that the potential harm
itself justified taking the case. In the discussion of the case in the clinic
seminar, most of the students who advocated taking the case did so
because of the perceived important constitutional principles involved:
members of the Court are acutely aware of the relationship between distance and power.
Chief Justice Assails Library on Release of Marshall Papers, N.Y. TSaEs, May 26, 1993,
pg. 1, col. 1.
122. West, supra note 6, at 53-61.
[Vol. 27:115
HeinOnline  -- 27 Ind. L. Rev. 152 1993-1994
1993] SELF-DISCLOSURE IN CLINICAL RELATIONSHIPS 153
i.e., that the government's attempt to take the women's property (in
this case her public housing apartment) violated the woman's consti-
tutional right to "due process" by not affording her a pre-seizure hearing.
Some students were concerned about whether the proposed client was
"really guilty" of the narcotics offense she was charged with and thus
would lose her apartment even if she got a pre-seizure hearing, and that
the "drug crisis" plaguing our country justified such action anyway.
Ellen felt many of her classmates, particularly her male classmates,
disrespected her reasoning. She questioned it herself.
Ellen's reaction to her classmates troubled me in at least two respects.
First, I thought the class discussion had been valuable precisely because
it raised both "rights" concerns and "care" concerns. Ellen's feeling
that many members of the class ridiculed her concern that the prospective
client and her children had become homeless, and that this should play
a role in any decision regarding whether to take the case, was thus a
matter of concern. Furthermore, I was concerned that Ellen's perspective
or any student's perspective not be silenced by the reaction of certain
class members.
I urged Ellen that her concerns were important, both in enriching
the class discussion and in informing her work as an advocate, in the
clinic and in her future career as a lawyer. We also talked about the
importance of asserting such concerns even in the face of other's ridicule.
I also spoke individually with the other students in the seminar, however,
about taking responsibility for behavior that might inhibit the expression
of opposing views.
Later that semester, an incident involving my students occurred in
a joint clinic class. [Several times each semester my clinic students attend
class with the students in other clinical programs in our law school.]
Some of the students from other clinics made presentations to the group,
after which the floor was opened for questions. After a presentation by
students who were defending police officers in a civil rights action brought
by a pro se plaintiff, several of the students in my clinic questioned
the student defense lawyers as to why limited clinic resources should be
used to defend police officers accused of brutality. Some of these were
the same students who had earlier ridiculed Ellen. Although many of
the students in the class were sympathetic with the viewpoint such
questions expressed, some objected to the way the student defense lawyers
had been challenged.
In response to this incident, Ellen designed and presented the fol-
lowing week's class for our clinic called, "The Student Lawyer as
Perceived by Others." Although the class was planned by a group of
students, the impetus for the class came from Ellen. In the class, the
clinic students participated in a roundtable discussion in roles as clinical
teachers, secretaries, clients, adversaries, co-counsel, "significant others"
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and students from other clinics. One student, modeling himself after a
traditional law school professor, moderated the discussion.
In collaborating with her classmates, some of whom were the very
students she felt had ridiculed her earlier, Ellen was able to find a place
for her care based instincts and was successful in getting members of
the class who earlier had denigrated her reasoning to accept its value.
The students who participated in the class were shocked to learn they
had been perceived as insensitive to the students in other clinics, and
concerned about the reaction, set about to repair the damage to their
relationships with those students.
IV. CONCLUSION: A REFLECTION ON THE EFFECTS OF A SEARCH FOR
BALANCE BETWEEN DISTANCE AND INTIMACY IN MY OWN SUPERVISION
What have the effects of my examination of intimacy been in my
own. supervision? Since beginning this project, I have become more self
conscious of my relationships with students. I am more reflective about
my choices to disclose to students, and more reflective about the cir-
cumstances under which I ask them to reveal something to me.
As a result, I have become slightly more cautious about how much
and in what ways I reveal myself to students. This is particularly true
in the early stages of my relationship with a student. I no longer, for
example, show pictures of my child to my students when I first meet
them, although I show them quite freely in personal social settings. I
tend to take more cues from my students concerning when to reveal
personal information. I volunteer information less often, and what I do
reveal is usually revealed in response to a student question.
Having come to a greater appreciation of the relationship between
gender, authority and disclosure, and having recognized that some of
my dilemmas around intimacy involve questions of power and control,
I think the choice to hold back slightly more is a good one for me.
Even so, since I came to this project thinking intimacy is a good thing
in clinical supervision, I find my reaction to hold back a little more at
the beginning an odd one. I suspect that I will be making corrections
continuously along a spectrum of disclosure and openness, that reflect
changes in me, in my students or in my perceptions of them, and in
my understanding of the dynamics affecting our relationships.
Although I am slightly more held back personally than I used to
be with students, I am at least as willing as I used to be to share
reasons for pedagogical choices with them. This seems especially true
for me in selecting students to participate in the clinic. I am much more
conscientious than I used to be about articulating for students the bases
of our pedagogy, making sure students understand my expectations of
them and my reasons for those expectations.
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With respect to disclosure that is neither purely personal nor ped-
agogical, I try to impose a connection test throughout my relationship
with students, in deciding whether to share information about myself
or in reflecting on choices I have made concerning disclosure. This is
not to suggest that I am constantly in control of my interactions or my
conversations, or even that I want to be. In retrospect, however, it is
the unconnected choices that I fault myself for most, like the choice to
show the new students the pictures of my baby.
I think I have always been more patient and cautious about asking
students to make disclosure than I have been about making it myself,
and I continue to be that way. I have a somewhat greater appreciation
of the hidden ways teachers can coerce disclosure from students, however,
and am more conscious of my power over them than I used to be.
Mirroring many of the issues in my supervision, the process of
writing this paper has been a process of separation and connection,
"doubting and believing"', choices about when to disclose, how much
my stories intrude on other's privacy, and when to hold back. Mediating
my own impulses to reveal and to hold back in this article has also,
no doubt, taught me about how to mediate those issues in my supervision
in ways that will continue to reveal themselves to me. Having asserted
this, it is time for me to let go of this paper, get back to supervision,
and test out my assertion.
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